Wednesday, December 30, 2009

CATATAN AKHIR TAHUN EKONOMI JOGJA 2009

Tahun 2009 boleh dibilang jadi tahun penuh tantangan bagi Indonesia. Sederet peristiwa entah sosial, politik, ekonomi bahkan hukum menjadi hal penting yang tak bisa dikesampingkan begitu saja. Dari sudut pandang ekonomi, kita juga memulai tahun 2009 dengan sedikit ketidakberuntungan. Apalagi jika bukan karena terpaan krisis keuangan global yang episentrumnya berada di USA akhir 2008 yang dipicu kasus subprime mortgage. Meski terpaan krisis yang ditandai runtuhnya lembaga keuangan Lehman Brothers ini tidaklah sedasyat krisis moneter 1997/1998, dampaknya tetap saja terasa hingga ke tahun 2009. Anjloknya kinerja ekspor menjadi salah satu contohnya.

Di tingkat lokal, beberapa daerah basis UKM (Usaha Kecil Menengah) potensial berorientasi ekspor, mau tak mau juga ikut menerima kenyataan pahitnya usaha akibat melemahnya permintaan. Di DIY, berdasarkan data Disperindagkop DIY bulan Februari, ekspor ke kawasan Amerika turun 20% sedangkan tujuan Perancis turun 40 %. Ekspor tujuan Italia dan Spanyol masing-masing juga turun 10% dan 15 %, meski beberapa tujuan lain seperti Canada, Jepang, Jerman dan Inggris sedikit mengalami kenaikan.

Data bulan Februari, total ekspor produk-produk DIY sebesar USD20,43 juta, dengan volume ekspor 5,36 juta kilogram. Jumlah ini lebih sedikit disbanding periode yang sama 2008 dimana total ekspor DIY mencapai USD 23,83 juta dengan volume sebesar 8,67 juta kilogram. Untung saja tidak semua UKM berorientasi ekspor, karena tak sedikit pula yang masih berstatus mikro, yang “tak begitu” merasakan melemahnya demand karena fokus di pasar domestik.

Tahun 2009 juga menjadi tahun perjuangan bagi banyak UMKM yang terkena dampak gempa 2006. Non Performing Loan (NPL) alias kredit bermasalah yang menimpa mereka, harus diperparah dengan habisnya perlakuan khusus (salah satunya keringanan penagihan oleh bank kreditur) yang termuat dalam Peraturan Bank Indonesia, PBI No.8/10/PBI/2006 akhir Juni. Meski akhirnya Melalui perjuangan UMKM dan tim ad hoc serta itikad baik dari BI, keluarlah PBI baru No 11/27/PBI/2009 ditetapkan tanggal 1 Juli, yang memperpanjang durasi perlakuan khusus hingga Desember 2010.

Pemda DIY sendiri telah membantu menyelesaikan 1.970 kasus NPL, dengan total nilai mencapai Rp4,8 miliar lebih tahun 2009. Tahun 2008 Pemda juga telah menyelesaikan 892 kasus NPL, dengan nilai mencapai Rp2,44 miliar lebih. Namun memang belum semua terselesaikan, karena diperkirakan masih ada 2.645 kasus NPL UMKM pasca gempa dengan total Rp81,5 miliar yang akan diselesaikan melalui skema APBN. Jumlah tersebut sebenarnya belumlah pasti karena laporan dan pendataan terus dilakukan. Kabar terakhir menyebutkan hingga pertengahan Desember jumlahnya berkurang menjadi Rp75,8 miliar karena 385 diantaranya telah lunas dan ratusan kasus lainnya “rusak” karena tidak sesuai ketentuan.

UKM jelas menjadi salah satu basis ekonomi DIY selain pariwisata. Hingga bulan Maret 2009 saja jumlah total UMKM (Usaha Mikro Kecil Menengah) DIY diperkirakan mencapai 76.300 lebih dengan penyerapan tenaga kerja tak kurang dari 273.621 orang. Jumlah ini tentu terus berubah seiring dengan perubahan dan dinamika yang ada.

Dari sektor pariwisata DIY, krisis keuangan juga sempat “menggoyang” bisnis pendukung wisata, khususnya usaha perhotelan. Perhimpunan Hotel dan Restoran Indonesia (PHRI) DIY bahkan mengklaim telah terjadi penurunan kunjungan wisatawan hingga 40% selama periode Januari hingga April 2009. Turunnya kunjungan wisatawan asing disinyalir menjadi salah satu sebabnya. Promosi agresif dan gencar lantas menjadi salah satu solusi yang dilakukan. PHRI DIY juga telah mengajukan usul ke Pemda setempat untuk mengalokasikan 5%-10% pajak dari hotel dan restoran dan digunakan sebagai dana promosi wisata. Menteri Budpar, Jero Wacik sendiri juga sempat mengungkapkan perlu dana setidaknya USD100 untuk mendatangkan seorang turis asing ke Indonesia.

Untung saja, bulan Juli menjadi salah satu titik tolak perbaikan kunjungan wisatawan ke DIY, ditandai dengan dimulainya libur sekolah. Dari catatan Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) DIY, terjadi kenaikan kunjungan wisatawan hingga 3,37% di bulan Juli, dibanding bulan sebelumnya. Jumlah tamu menginap di DIY selama Juli yang mencapai 282.762 orang, sedangkan Juni hanya mencapai 273.543 orang.

Mobilitas penumpang angkutan udara juga ikut terdongkrak hingga di atas 10%, akibat momen liburan sekolah yang berlangsung hingga pertengahan Juli. Jumlah penumpang yang datang melalui bandara Adisutjipto bulan Juli 2009 mencapai 158.134 penumpang. Lebih tinggi 10,38% dibanding jumlah penumpang selama Juni, yang hanya 143.263 orang. Uniknya, sektor perhotelan DIY juga mengalami imbas tak terduga saat terjadi aksi terorisme peledakan bom Ritz Calrton Kuningan bulan Juli lalu. Dikabarkan hotel-hotel di Jogja justru penuh karena banyaknya pengalihan tamu dari Jakarta dan Bali karena Jogja dirasa cukup aman.

Menjelang penghujung tahun, titik cerah di sektor wisata juga semakin terlihat. Sektor perhotelan mengalami siklus rutin peak season, akibat berbagai momen libur nasional mulai dari Lebaran, Natal hingga Tahun Baru. Tingkat hunian 17 hotel berbintang dipatok 100% selama momen-momen tersebut. PHRI sendiri menargetkan tahun ini tak kurang dari 350.000 turis asing masuk ke DIY.

Memang terlalu sempit jika melihat perkembangan pariwisata hanya dari sektor perhotelan saja, karena nyatanya banyak sektor lain yang mendukung, seperti infrastruktur, perpajakan, hingga perdagangan. Namun setidaknya perbaikan tersebut bisa menjadi sinyal positif dalam perkembangan pariwisata DIY, dan mampu menjadi momentum komitmen setiap elemen untuk bersama-sama mengambil langkah terbaik kemajuan pariwisata DIY. Perjuangan belum selesai.

Monday, October 26, 2009

Dinamika menuju pasar bebas, tak bisa dibendung tapi bisa berkelit

UMKM SEKARANG BELUM SIAP

Oleh Galih Kurniawan

JOGJA:Gaung pasar bebas agaknya semakin keras beberapa waktu belakangan. Pola yang dianggap sebagai bagian dari integrasi ekonomi antar bangsa ini, oleh beberapa pihak dianggap perlu untuk segera dilakukan. Salah satu alasan yang sering mengemuka adalah “keseimbangan” transaksi, yang harus membuka diri satu sama lain untuk mendapatkan benefit.

Mengutip pernyataan, Ketua API DIY, Jadin C Jamaludin, konsisi UMKM saat ini belumlah siap menghadapi era pasar bebas. Menurutnya kondisi UMKM saat ini hanya sebatas image saja, karena ideologi soal UMKM dari pemerintah tidak jelas mengarah ke mana. “UMKM ini kan terbentuk dari masyarakat kecil, mereka yang tidak terserap ke sektor formal akhirnya beralih ke sektor in formal. Yang harus dilakukan justru adalah penguatan dari bawah, internal UMKM. Globalisasi mungkin tak bisa dibendung tapi kita bisa berkelit, tinggal bagaimana pemerintah,” tegasnya.

Ia mencontohkan bagaimana awalnya dulu China banyak diklaim sebagai penjiplak, namun pemerintahnya benar-benar melakukan penguatan masyarakat bawah. “Ibaratnya kita tertinggal 20 tahun dari negara maju, mindset UMKM harus diubah ke yang sebenarnya. Perbankan juga saya kira terlalu cepat melakukan independensi,”.

Daya saing
Hal yang agak ambigu justru diungkapan Kepala Pusat Studi Asia Pasifik UGM, Sri Adiningsih, karena posisi dukungannya yang belum bisa “ditegaskan”. Ia mengatakan, dari hasil penelitiannya di tahun 2007, ada wilayah yang justru beralih menjadi pedagang dari sebelumnya produsen. “Penelitian tahun 2007 di Surakarta, khususnya untuk produk tekstil, banyak produsen yang berubah haluan menjadi pedagang, jumlahnya sekitar 20%,”. Menurut dia hal itu disebabkan karena daya saing produknya yang rendah, kalah dengan produk impor dari China. “Mereka banyak yang yang memilih impor produk dari China, karena untuk produksi sendiri justru perlu biaya lebih mahal dan berisiko,” timpalnya.

Namun begitu ia juga mengungkapkan, jika memang ke depan masa depan APEC mengarah ke free trade area, prospek bisnis Indonesia kesempatannya makin besar, meski persaingan juga makin ketat. “Dari studi kita di Cilegon tahun 2008, ternyata FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) khususnya bidang kimia dan farmasi secara umum memberikan keuntungan bagi ekonomi. Yakni dalam hal nilai tambah dan penyediaan lapangan kerja,”. Ia juga memaparkan, hasil studinya yang terakhir di Cilacap memperlihatkan, ekonomi APEC merupakan tujuan penting dari TKI dan TKW. Nah lho...jadi liberalisasi didukung atau ditolak bu?????

Wednesday, October 21, 2009

Resensi Buku: Ekonomika Indonesia (Mudrajad Kuncoro)


SAATNYA PAHAM EKONOMI BANGSA SENDIRI


Oleh Galih Kurniawan

Dinamika perkembangan negara, baik secara internal maupun regional tentu tak bisa lepas dari perubahan perekonomian yang ada, yang juga saling terkait. Ekonomi internasional adalah satu hal, tapi di sisi lain juga ada ekonomi nasioanal yang perlu dipahami (untuk tidak menyebut lebih penting), oleh siapapun yang memang peduli (atau sekedar ingin tahu) pada bangsa ini.

Namun sayang, literatur yang membahas mengenai perekonomian nasional Indonesia, kebanyakan justru datang dari penulis-penulis asing yang justru berani (dan mau) mengangkat sisi lain Indonesia dari sudut pandang ekonomi. Hal ini pulalah yang mendasari Guru Besar Fakultas Ekonomi UGM, sekaligus pakar ekonomi nasional, Prof Mudrajd Kuncoro Phd, menghadirkan salah satu buku terbarunya berjudul Ekonomika Indonesia yang dirangkumnya dari “perjalanan analisanya” selama lima tahun terakhir.

Sekilas melihat fisik buku, dengan tebal tak kurang dari 510 halaman (bahkan awalnya ditulis lebih banyak), reaksi pertama dari calon pembaca pasti “awang-awangen”. Namun beda kiranya jika sudah membaca beberapa bab dari buku ini, alur ceritanya jauh dari kesan teoritis khas akademisi, karena justru fakta-fakta praktis atas berbagai peristiwa juga banyak diungkap penulis yang terkenal “mahir bercerita angka” ini.

Meksi begitu, dukungan data empiris tetap menjadi daya penguat yang patut diapresiasi atas keberhasilan dalam mengungkap sisi human interest dari data tersebut. Misalnya saja, pembahasan mengenai pola pergerakan kurs valas yang dibahas di bab lima. Ternyata dalam setiap pemerintahan pasca krisis ekonomi, pergerakan kurs memiliki tendensi yang berbeda-beda, khususnya pada pasa pemerintahan Abdurrahman Wahid. Dalam sebuah kesempatan bertemu, penulis mengungkapkan bahwa pada masa Gus Dur, ternyata banyak pelaku pasar yang menunggu statemen Gus Dur usai sholat Jumat, meski tidak mempengaruhi fluktuasi perdagangan nilai tukar di hari Senin.

Tak hanya menceritakan peristiwa-peristiwa yang telah menjadi bagian sejarah, dalam buku ini penulis secara tidak langsung juga mengajak siapapun (terutama pemerintah) untuk berkaca pada sejarah dalam rangka pembangunan ekonomi Indonesia ke depan. Pada bab 19, Mengembangkan Ekonomi Kerakyatan Dengen Akselerasi Sektor Riil dan UMKM, materi dan pembahasan (retoris?) yang disampaikan layak menjadi pertimbangan tersendiri bagi penentu kebijakan. Belum lagi bab 23, yang membahas percepatan pembangunan daerah tertinggal sebagai upaya pemerataan pembangunan dan hasilnya, bisa menjadi semacam “konsideran” bagi para petinggi-petinggi negara.

Kesimpulannya, seperti yang ditulis Prof Mudrajad dalam kata pengantarnya, buku ini adalah salah satu upaya membumikan ekonomika Indonesia dengan contoh kebijakan, kasus dan data Indonesia, dan langsung ditulis oleh orang Indonesia, sudah selayaknya mendapat apresiasi. Meski tak dipungkiri masih ada beberapa “tema” yang belum selesai dibahas dalam buku ini, namun justru itu bisa menjadi bahan yang bisa didiskusikan alias debatable. Pola-pola ini juga yang agaknya menjadi salah satu tujuan penulis menghadirkan teme-teme menggelitik entah hasil pengalaman sendiri atau hasil diskusi dengan narasumber lainnya.

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Menyambut gairah baru....now it's show time

Setelah sekian lama terpasung dalam kekosongan, tercerabutnya angan dari nyata...akhirnya kutemukan kembali "ide yang hilang" meski dengan pena dan kertas yang berbeda dan agak aneh...thanks for the chance my LORD

Friday, February 6, 2009

PRESS RELEASE
KETUA SPS TELANTARKAN KARYAWAN INDONESIA BUSINESS TODAY

JAKARTA—Sungguh ironis, kongklomerat pers yang juga ketua Serikat Penerbit Surat Kabar (SPS), Dahlan Iskan, ternyata menelantarkan karyawannya. Itulah yang terjadi pada Koran Indonesia Business Today. Koran yang dimilki oleh raja media, Dahlan Iskan tersebut, mulai Kamis (5/2) menghentikan kegiatannya.

Penghentian penerbitan tersebut merupakan puncak kekecewaan para awak Indonesia Business Today kepada Dahlan. Di antara kekecewaan tersebut adalah belum dibayarnya gaji karyawan sejak Desember 2008. Karaywan sendiri sebenarnya sudah mencoba menuruti kemauan Dahlan yang mencoba melakukan efisiensi dengan mengubah Koran yang berdiri sendiri menjadi sekedar sisipan di Indo Pos.

November 2008, di kantor Indonesia Business Today, di kawasan Fatmawati Jakarta, Dahlan mengatakan bahwa kondisi ekonomi dunia yang sedang dilanda krisis pasti akan mengimbas ke Indonesia. “Sebelum krisis melanda, kita harus sudah mengantisipasinya,”ujar Dahlan ketika itu.

Karena itulah, lanjut Dahlan,”Kita harus melakukan upaya agar tidak tergilas oleh krisis.” Untuk itulah, solusi yang ditawarkan oleh Dahlan adalah melakukan penggabungan dua Koran yakni Indonesia Business Today dengan Indo Pos. Penggabungan itu dilakukan dengan pertimbangan bahwa masing-masing punya kelebihan. Indonesia Business Today kuat di rubric-rubrik ekonomi, sementara Indo Pos, katanya kuat di Politik.

Jika kelebihan-kelebihan itu digabungkan, tentu akan menghasilkan produk atau koran yang unggul di semua lini. Sehingga diharapkan, sinergi tersebut bisa menjadi senjata yang ampuh untuk memenangkan persaingan media cetak yang makin tajam belakangan ini.

Ketika ide itu dilontarkan, banyak Indonesia Business Today yang merasa resah. Karena bukan tidak mungkin jika itu dilakukan, pasti akan mengurangi jumlah karyawan. Hal itu bukan tanpa alasan. Soalnya, bagaimana mungkin mempertahankan jumlah karyawan yang ada sementara jumlah halaman yang harus dikerjakan dipotong hanya tinggal sepertiga. Yaitu dari 24 halaman menjadi hanya 8 halaman saja. Selain itu, divisi sirkulasi dan iklan juga akan disatukan.

Toh, kekhawatiran tersebut, ditepis oleh Dahlan. Menurutnya masalah pengurangan karyawan tidak ada hubungannya dengan pengurangan jumlah halaman. “Pemutusan hubungan kerja (PHK) tidak ada kaitannya dengan kebijakan baru ini. Jika memang kualitas karyawan sesuai dengan yang dibutuhkan perusahaan, maka tidak akan ada yang di PHK,”tegasnya.

Mulai Penggabungan
Rencana itu pun, mulai dijalankan. Beberapa kali rapat koordinasi dilakukan dengan pihak Indo Pos. Nama-nama karyawan yang akan dipekerjakan dalam kerjasama in pun, mulai dibahas, termasuk berapa mereka akan menerima gaji.

Alangkah kagetnya para awak redaksi Indonesia Business Today ketika mendengar usulan dari Indo Pos, bahwa gaji karyawan Indonesia Business Today akan dipotong dengan besaran yang tidak tanggung-tanggung. Dalam kerjasama tersebut, awak Indonesia Business Today akan dipotong gajinya rata-rata 50 persen. Bahkan ada yang ditirunkan posisinya dari redaktur menjadi reporter dengan potongan gaji hingga 70 persen. Selain itu, dari sekitar 50 nama awak redaksi yang ada, hanya 28 yang akan diterima menjadi bagian koran baru tersebut.

Tentu saja usulan tersebut sangat memukul para awak Indonesia Business Today. Negosiasi pun, dilanjutkan beberapa kali hingga akhirnya disepakati jumlah awak yang akan dipekerjakan adalah sesuai usulan Indonesia Business Today. Selain itu, potongan gaji juga direvisi menjadi antara 10 persen hingga 25 persen sesuai dengan posisi karyawan tersebut. Maka, sejak Desember 2008, resmilah Indo Pos cetak 32 halaman, dengan 8 halaman Indonesia Business Today.

Rupanya, kesepakatan hanya tinggal kesepakatan, karena Dahlan sama sekali tidak menepati janji. Akhir Desember 2008, para awak Indonesia Business Today ternyata tidak menerima gaji seperti yang dijanjikan. Untunglah manajemen Indonesia Business Today merupakan orang-orang yang bertanggungjawab terhadap semua kewajiban terhadap karyawan. Dengan upaya keras, manajemen akhirnya mendapat dana pinjaman untuk membayar gaji karyawan.

Mulai dari situlah kekecewaan-demi kekecewaan dialami oleh para awak Indonesia Business Today. Yang paling menyakitkan adalah ketika dalam kondisi kritis yang membutuhkan perhatian pemilik perusahaan, ternyata Dahlan Iskan sangat sulit dihubungi. Keresahan pun, makin memuncak seiring dengan mendekatnya tanggal gajian Bulan Januari.

Selama seminggu sebelum tanggal gajian, pihak manajemen berupaya keras untuk menghubungi Dahlan. Sayang panggilan telepon, pesan singkat, maupun surat elektronik tidak ditanggapi sama sekali oleh Dahlan. Akhirnya bulan Januari pun, berakhir tanpa ada kabar berita sama sekali dari Dahlan. Yang ada hanyalah pemberitahuan dari Indo Pos, yang berjanji akan membayar gaji karyawan. Namun, surat itu sangat menyakitkan karena isinya memberitahukan bahwa karyawan hanya akan menerima 50 persen gaji. Itu pun, jumlah penerima hanya 28 orang bukan 50.

Lagi-lagi janji hanya sekedar janji. Sepeser pun, tidak ada dana yang keluar dari Dahlan. Akibatnya, kembali manajemen yang pontang-panting mencari dana talangan untuk membayar gaji karyawan.

Kekecewaan demi kekecewaan itulah akhirnya yang membuat awak Indonesia Business Today mulai 5 Februari 2009 menghentikan semua kegiatan jurnalistik.

Dengan berbagai fakti itulah, karyawan Indonesia Business Today, akan melakukan langkah-langkah yang dianggap perlu untuk menuntut hak sesuai dengan ketentuan hokum dan perundangan yang berlaku di Indonesia.


Forum Karyawan Indonesi Business Today


Ketua
Wahid Rahmanto

Sekretaris
Dewi Agustina


Kontak Person:
Wahid Rahmanto (HP) 0852-1328-2938

Wednesday, February 4, 2009

MASIH PERLUKAH BUYBACK?

JAKARTA – Kebijakan buyback yang diberikan oleh Bapepam sejak meluasnya dampak krisis keuangan global lalu, ternyata masih belum dimaksimalkan oleh beberapa emiten. Hal tersebut terbukti dari masih adanya 8 emiten yang belum merealisasikan program buybacknya.

Dalam siaran pers oleh Bapepam (3/2/2009), ternyata masih ada 8 emiten yang belum merealisasikan buybacknya. Selain itu juga tercatat 5 emiten mengajukan perpanjangan program buyback. Dari delapan emiten yang belum melakukan buyback tersebut, sebanyak 5 emiten bahkan sudah lewat masa periode buybacknya. Dari kelimanya emiten tersebut juga tercatat Kimia Farma dan PT Timah yang notabene merupakan BUMN.

Dengan melihat kondisi pasar yang sudah mulai membaik, maka tak heran jika banyak pihak yang kemudian mempertanyakan efektfitas jika kebijakan buyback tetap dilakukan. Memang selama ini banyak perusahaan yang listing di Bursa Efek Indonesia yang memanfaatkan fasilitas buyback oleh Bapepam. Semenjak terpaan badai krisis keuangan global pada medio 2008 lalu, Bapepam memang memberikan “legalitas” untuk melakukan buyback bagi emiten. Hal tersebut dimaksudkan untuk mengurangi dampak pasar yang berfluktuasi secara signifikan. 

Namun begitu, usai proses buyback periode pertama dilakukan, banyak yang mempertanyakan efektifitas buyback yang dilakukan oleh beberapa emiten termasuk emiten BUMN. Menurut pengamat pasar modal, Daniel Listiadi, dari beberapa program buyback yang selam ini dilakukan, hanya PTBA yang terlihat signifikan manfaat buybacknya, sedang saham emiten-emiten lainnya ternyata masih berada dalam tekanan.

Ia sendiri menilaiprogram buyback yang banyak dilakukan saat ini memang sedikit special. Hal itu karena kebijakannya agak sedikit diperlonggar oleh otoritas bursa, mengingat kondisi bursa memang masih dalam tekanan. Namun menurutnya, jika dilihat lebih jauh lagi, selama ini rasio antara jumlah maksimal saham yang akan dibuyback dengan dana yang disediakan untuk buyback, masih sangat jauh. 

Menurut Daniel, kondisi sekarang agaknya berbeda karena bapepam banyak memberikan support. “Nampaknya mereka ingin menjaga valuasi saham-saham BUMN” jelasnya. Ia menambahkan bahwa kebijakan buyback ini sepertinya dilakukan untuk penyelamatan saham-saham BUMN. 

Jika diperhatikan lagi, memang selama ini program buyback yang dilakukan oleh banyak emiten, terbilang berjalan lambat dan realisasinya tidak terlalu signifikan. Daniel memperkirakan bahwa hal-hal yang membuat hal tersebut terjadi adalah bahwa volatilitas harga di pasar ternyata sudah mulai terangkat naik dengan sendirinya. Lebih lanjut ia mengatakan bahwa jika kondisi ini terjadi, bisa saja emiten menghentikan program buybacknya. “Lebih baik dana yang masih tersedia digunakan untuk investasi usaha lain” jelasnya.

Hal lain yang juga mempengaruhi kebijakan buyback adalah bahwa, kondisi keuangan dan kinerja sektor emiten masing-masing, masih dalam tekanan. Sehingga yang terjadi selama ini porsi buyback yang terealisasi agak kurang. Seperti contoh Kimia Farma yang masih belum ada realisasi buybacknya. “Bisa saja karena melihat pergerakan sahamnyasudah agak bagus dengan sendirinya, maka buyback tidak direalisasikan” ungkapnya. Namun jika dilihat dari sektor farmasi, ia menilai hanya KLBV yang masih rekomendasi untuk buy.  “Emiten lainnya masih mengalami hambatan” katanya.

Secara umum Daniel memperkirakan kondisi pasar modal indonesia ke depan, baru akan mencapai peak up pada kuartal 2 2009. Namun hal tersebut masih harus menunggu implementasi paket stimulus dari beberapa negara, khususnya amerika. “Kondisi ekonomi global saat ini memang masih melemah, namun di level nasional, dengan adanya tren pemangkasan BI rate, dan autorejection yang baru, nampaknya akan memberikan dampak yang signifikan” pungkasnya. 

Monday, February 2, 2009

SAMPOERNA AGRO BUKUKAN PENJUALAN Rp 2,288.21 TRILIUN SELAMA 2008

Penjualan PT Sampoerna Agro Tbk tahun 2008 lalu mencapai Rp 2,288.21 triliun. Jumlah tersebut melonjak 41 persen dari penjualan tahun 2007 sebesar Rp 1.598.930.908.000. Menurut Corporate Secretary SGRO, Budianto Tjuaja, kepada Indonesia Business Today, Senin (2/1), kenaikan penjualan tersebut sebagai akibat dari jumlah produksi CPO sebesar 8 persen. 

Dari data produksi tahun 2008 sebanyak 1.079.568 ton berasal dari Tandan Buah Segar (TBS) Sumatera. Sebesar 150.950 ton dari TBS di Kalimantan. Di Sumatera, SGRO memiliki lahan seluas 70.614 hektar sedang di Kalimantan SGRO mempunyai lahan seluas 90.055 hektar. 

Produksi minyak sawit sebesar 265.468 ton, inti sawit mengasilkan 70.622 ton. Untuk kecambah dan karet sepanjang tahun lalu produksinya masing-masing mencapai 22,735 juta biji dan 483 ton. 

Sumbangan terbesar dari penjualan tahun 2008 berasal dari penjualan CPO sebesar Rp 1,932.74 triliun. Budiman mengakui memang tahun 2008 lalu sempat menaikkan harga CPO nya. Namun ia belum bisa mengatakan akankah terjadi kenaikan harga di tahun 2009. "Saya sendiri belum tahu, tapi krisis keuangan global yang terjadi selama ini relatif tidak banyak mempengaruhi kinerja kita" ujarnya. 

Adanya kenaikan harga minyak secara drastis tahun 2008 lalu, memang membuat CPO menjadi primadona. Produksi dan penjualan CPO dunia mengalami kenaikan drastic. Namun ketika momen kenaikan harga minyak selesai, dan harga minyak terus turun akibat melimpahnya produksi, harga komoditas CPO sempat anjlok. Tercatat pada perda September tahun lalu, saat harga minyak mulai turun, harga CPO untuk pengiriman November di Malaysia Derivatives Exchange, merosot 6,7% menjadi RM2.090 atau setara dengan US$605 per ton. Harga tersebut adalah level terendah sejak April 2007. 

Harga jual rata-rata komoditas SGRO tahun 2008 lalu, minyak sawit sebesar Rp 6.730 er kilogram. Inti sawit selama 2008 rata-rata dijual Rp 3.564 per kilogram. Untuk komoditas kecambah, per biji harga rata-ratanya sebesar Rp 5.182 selama 2008. Sedang untuk komoditas karet harga jual tahun lalu rata-rata sebesar Rp 12.925 per kiligram. 

Penjualan inti sawit selama 2008 lalu adalah sebesar Rp 253,72 miliar. Dari produksi kecambahnya, SGRO berhasil mendapatkan penjualanl Rp 95,51 miliar. Sementara dari hasil karetnya, SGRO membukukan penjualan Rp 6,24 miliar selama tahun 2008. 

Dari data tersebut dapat dilihat jika permintaan dalam negeri akan produk komoditas dari SGRO tidak mengalami penurunan akibat krisis. "Selama ini hapir 95 persen lebih penjualan kita di dalam negeri" terang Budianto. Untuk ekspor, kebanyakan komoditas SGRO dipasarkan di kawasan Asia

Pada penutupan perdagangan kemarin, Senin (2/1), harga saham SGRO ditutup melemah 0,02 persen ke level Rp 1.150 denga frekuesi transaksi sebanyak 167 kali. Kapitalisasi pasarnya sendiri mencapai Rp 2.173.499.998.208.

Analis David Cornelis/Pengamat Pasar Modal

Adanya tren penurunan harga minyak akan sangat berpengaruh terhadap harga komoditas. Ekspektasinya pada tahun 2009 ini minyak mengalami konsolidasi yang artinya sudah mendekati bottomnya. Sehingga diharapkan dapat kembali rebound, setelah turun jauh dengan siginfikan di tahun 2008. Walaupun terjadi deflasi dalam 2 bulan terakhir, masih ada optimisme di industri CPO. Apalagi Indonesia sebagai negara produsen terbesar (di samping Malaysia). akan memiliki power sebagai market leader dan dapat melakukan langkah-langkah untuk menjaga stabilitas harga. Dengan ekspektasi sudah mulai terjadi perlambatan penurunan, (yang sekarang terlihat mulai konsolidasi) dan diproyeksikan akan mulai lagi rebound di H2, seiring terjadinya recovery global economic, maka untuk sekarang sektor ini masih kurang atraktif dan investor cenderung ke sektor lainnya. Namun untuk jangka panjang, ini masih prospektif. Di sektor komoditas ini, masih prefer AALI over all dan kedua LSIP. (Buy on Weakness)

 

 

 

 

Sunday, February 1, 2009

HOLCIM JAMIN TAK ADA PENGHENTIAN PABRIK

JAKARTA – PT Holcim Indonesia Tbk (SMCB) menjamin bahwa kondisi perseroan saat ini masih cukup kuat. Hal tersebut disampaikan oleh Manajer Komunikasi SMCB, Budi Primawan ketika ditanya mengenai kemungkinan penghentian sementara kegiatan pabrik perseroan akibat gejolak ekonomi global.

Hal ini terkait dengan adanya kabar bahwa Holcim Ltd untuk mempertimbangkan menutup beberapa pabriknya di Holcim Philippines Inc akibat turunnya demand. Dalam keterbukaan informasi yang disampaikan di Philipine Stock Exchange (26/1) lalu, pihak Holcim Philipines Inc mengkonfirmasi kebenaran substansial pernyataan COO Holcim, Ian S Thackwray. Ian S Thackwray sempat mengatakan ada kemungkinan penghentian sementara kegiatan pabrik semen Holcim di Philipina akibat slow demand. Ian sendiri juga mengatakan bahwa, jika hal tersebut jadi dilakukan, pihaknya menjamin tidak akan ada layoff karyawan.

Dalam kaitannya dengan berita tersebut, Budi Primawan meyakinan bahwa saat ini demand nasional terhadap produk semen masih ada. Ia sendiri mengatakan bahwa kinerja perseroan tahun lalu cukup bagus, walaupun ia bersedia menyebut angka pasti. “Tapi semua terefleksi dari kinerja Q3 2008 yang cukup baik, pasti naik” ujarnya kepada Indonesia Business Today, Minggu (1/2). Dari laporan Q3 2008, SMCB mencatat penjualan di atas Rp 3 triliun dan laba bersih Rp 546,868 miliar, semuanya naik dari 2007.  

Lebih lanjut untuk pembangunan pabrik ketiga di Tuban, Budi mengakui bahwa kemungkinan tidak akan terealisasi tahun ini. Hal tersebut karena kondisi masih sulit sehingga terjadi penundaan. Penundaan ini sendiri terjadi karena pembengkakan biaya pembangunan pabrik akibat adanya kenaikan harga baja. Diperkirakan pembengkakan mencapai 25-43 persen dari anggaran dana semula yakni USD 420 juta. Sebelumnya SMCB memiliki dua pabrik yang berlokasi di Cilacap, Jawa Tengah dan Narogong, Bogor, Jawa Barat. Dari kedua pabriknya tersebut, SMCB memiliki total kapasitas produksi sebesar 7,9 juta ton. 

Dari data Indonesia Cement Statistic, tahun 2007 lalu market share domestik SMCB sebesar 14,6 persen. Berada diurutan kedua dibawah Semen Gresik dengan 21,7 persen. Target market share tahun ini, Budi mengatakan juga belum tahu. “Yang jelas rencana pembangunan pabrik di Tuban adalah upaya kita memperkuat pasar domestik” ujarnya. Diperkirakan jika pabrik Tuban terealisasi, maka akan menambah kapasitas produksi semen SMCB menjadi 10,5 juta ton sampai 2011. Selama ini pasar semen SMCB memang dominan di dalam negeri. Ekspor dilakukan hanya jika ada kelebihan, untuk membantu pabrik Holcim lainnya di luar negeri.

Untuk rencana merger dengan anak usaha PT Semen Dwima Agung, Budi mengatakan realisasinya mungkin tidak tahun ini. “Merger ini hanya untuk penyederhanaan administratif saja” ujarnya. Terkait dengan harga saham SMCB sejauh ini, Budi mengaku cukup puas karena terjadi tren kenaikan. Karena itulah ia mengatakan bahwa SMCB belum memiliki rencana untuk melakukan buyback atas sahamnya. Saham SMCB pada perdagangan Jumat, (30/1) ditutup menguat 0.02 persen ke level Rp 580 per lembar saham.

David Cornelis/Pengamat Pasar Modal
Dengan adanya pemangkasan BI rate memang proyeksinya akan lebih atraktif bagi seluruh industri karena perubahan di sisi makro akan berpengaruh ke mikro. Namun tentunya butuh penyesuaian, ada 'time lag'nya. Biasanya berkisar 1-2 bulan. Secara umum akan memberi efek katalis dan sentimen yg positif, terutama ke industri manufaktur, semen, dan terkahir ke sektor property. Pertumbuhan penjualan semen di tahun 2008 masih double digit sekitar 13%. Untuk proyeksi 2009 kurang lebih akan flat atau cenderung turun karena tipisnya margin. Risiko yang muncul adalah terhambatnya kredit yang didapat. Urutannya preferensi untuk investor semen adalah INTP SMCB SMGR. SMCB sebenarnya lebih atraktif, walaupun dari sisi debt to equity ratio masih lebih tinggi dari peersnya (INTP,SMGR).



Saturday, January 31, 2009

PEAK OIL? GLOBAL WARMING? NO, IT's 'BOOMSDAY!'
Five reasons 'population explosion' is world's biggest economic problem
By Paul B. Farrell, MarketWatch

ARROYO GRANDE, Calif. (MarketWatch) -- Six years ago, Peter Orszag, President Obama's new budget director, co-authored a Brookings Institution study that concluded: "Balancing the budget would require a 41% cut in spending on Social Security and Medicare, a 47% cut in discretionary spending, or a 17% cut in all non-interest spending." It's getting worse: Today entitlements eat up 40% of the federal budget and are growing.

No doubt Orszag's earlier thinking had a lot to do with why Obama picked him. But it's also a signal of what we can expect when a Social Security reform bill is sent to Congress during Obama's "first 100 days." And that will trigger a brutal battle. Why? Because AARP's 35 million members will fight all benefits reductions while young voters who put Obama in office will fight any new Social Security taxes.

Bruising battle? It won't matter. In the long term, reforming entitlements will be like rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Remember, Obama's adding a $1 trillion stimulus package on top of what Nobel economist Joseph Stiglitz calls a "$10 trillion hangover" of debt left by former President Bush and the economic meltdown. And all that's on top of the massive $60 trillion to $75 trillion of unfunded Social Security and Medicare liabilities.

To get perspective, let's shift our thinking into a parallel universe: Into Chris Buckley's satirical novel "Boomsday," which goes way beyond acceptable government policies. He offers a bizarre solution to reforming Social Security, a solution that forces all of us to focus, and not just on the out-of-control economics of retirement entitlements. He forces us to focus on the one core problem overshadowing all other global economic issues: Population growth.

Too Many Boomers and Babies in This Equation
Yes, population is the core problem that, unless confronted and dealt with, will render all solutions to all other problems irrelevant. Population is the one variable in an economic equation that impacts, aggravates, irritates and accelerates all other problems. Imagine you're on a call with the Oval Office:

"Listen to me," the frustrated U.S. president says on the phone in "Boomsday:" "I got a collapsing economy. I'm fighting four wars -- and looks like another is on the way." Agitated. "I got melting ice caps on both poles. Florida just lost another two feet of waterfront. Hundred square miles of Mississippi just went under." Faster. "I got a drought in the West the Interior Department says is going to make Colorado and Wyoming into another dust bowl." Breathless. "Pakistan and India are going at each other like a couple of wet cats. The CIA's telling me Israel's preparing to launch nuclear weapons." He's shaking. "I don't have time to take on a one-legged senator who says the solution to Social Security is for us to kill ourselves at age 70. The way I'm feeling now, I may shoot myself. And I may not wait until I'm 70."

Yes, you heard right. He's reacting to a proposal made by Cassandra Devine, a character in "Boomsday." She's a young, hot PR hustler running a "must read" blog. She resents the fact that her generation is getting stuck with the tax bill to pay Social Security benefits for retiring boomers. At first, her proposal was just a wake-up call, a shocker to get attention, to get Washington to deal with a hot-button issue politicians refuse to face. Her plan: Reduce population by encouraging suicides for aging boomers.

Bogus Math and Economic Equations
OK, so suicide's a bizarre, unacceptable solution. But "Boomsday" does put the problem in sharp focus: No, it's not "peak oil." Not global warming. It's the population explosion: Too many people, old and young, boomers and babies too. More and more people filling up our little planet.

And while she proposes eliminating boomers, throughout history other writers, warriors and governments have dealt with the other end, limiting births -- from family planning, infanticide, even genocide. Yet few expect change at either end of this spectrum. Indeed, a United Nation's study estimates the world population will continue exploding, from 6.6 billion to 9.3 billion by 2050!

And not only will there be about 50% more people on the planet before today's kids reach the age of the youngest boomers today, but every year they'll also be demanding more opportunities, more benefits and more resources for their personal economic growth as well as for the expansion of their national economies. Warning: by 2050 America's 400 million will be vastly outnumbered by 8.9 billion others across the planet, all competing with America.

In short, within four decades human demands will easily double. That makes population growth the key variable in every economic equation ... impacting every other major issue facing world economies ... from peak oil to global warming ... from foreign policy to nuclear threats ... from religion to science ... everything. Population is the No. 1 variable in the economic equation.

And here's how an exploding population will remain the key variable driving all other major economic issues in the next four short decades:

1. Global wars ... over food, water and energy
Five years ago Fortune reported on "The Pentagon's Weather Nightmare." Yes, from inside our military comes a warning of "the mother of all national security issues." As "the planet's carrying capacity shrinks, an ancient pattern reemerges: the eruption of desperate all-out wars over food, water, and energy supplies." But ask yourself: What if nations prioritized population control policies to minimize growth and reduce demand?

2. 'Global warming' ... and nuclear threats
Will it work? In the latest Foreign Policy magazine, environmental economist Bill McKibben, author of "The End of Nature," warns: "It might already be too late ... to save the planet from a climate catastrophe." The International Energy Agency's answer is more supply to feed exploding demand: The world must spend "$45 trillion to build 1,400 nuclear power plants and vastly expand wind power" in order to "halve greenhouse gas emissions by 2050." Their supply-side obsession assumes three billion more people. But what if we focused on cutting demand by stabilizing world population at 6 billion?

3. 'Peak oil' ... versus 'peak population'
Experts warn that "The Age of Oil" is over. Soon the marginal cost of extracting a barrel will equal the sale price. We are on the downside of the bell curve. Special interests like Exxon-Mobil and the Saudis disagree.

But check sites like LifeAftertheOilCrash.com: "Civilization as we know it is coming to an end soon. This is not the wacky proclamation of a doomsday cult, apocalypse bible prophecy sect, or conspiracy theory society. Rather, it is the scientific conclusion of the best paid, most widely respected geologists, physicists, bankers and investors in the world. These are rational, professional, conservative individuals who are absolutely terrified by a phenomenon known as global 'peak oil.'" Warning: We're near the tipping point: Stabilize population or self-destruct.

4. Alternative energies, 'political will' and lobbyists
Wall Street, Washington and Corporate America hustle the myth that we must become "energy independent." History suggests narrow special-interest lobbyists will dull the "political will to act" till we pass the point of no return. Our population will grow from 300 million to 400 million by 2050, but the rest of the world will add another 3 billion, with all demanding more economic resources to meet burgeoning demands for energy, food and water. If the world's population isn't addressed, we'll be outnumbered and outgunned.

5. The mythological math of 'economic growth'
Economic equations stumble on bogus data. Last spring political historian Kevin Phillips wrote a brilliant Harper's article "Numbers Racket" warning us that "the economy is worse than we know." Politicians use "deceptive statistics" to sell "Americans that the U.S. economy is stronger, fairer, more productive, more dominant, and richer with opportunity than it really is. The corruption has tainted the very measures that most shape public perception of the economy."

Making matters worse, economists are part of this conspiracy, tacitly endorsing government propaganda about progress.

Evolutionary geologist Jared Diamond put all this in perspective in his Pulitzer Prize-winning "Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed:" "One of the disturbing facts of history is that so many civilizations collapse. Few people, however, least of all our politicians, realize that a primary cause of the collapse of those societies has been the destruction of the natural resources on which they depend. Fewer still appreciate that many of those civilizations share a sharp curve of decline. Indeed, a society's demise may begin only a decade or two after it reaches its peak population, wealth and power."

What's the one common reason societies, cultures, nations have collapsed across the world and throughout history? Leaders "focused only on issues likely to blow up in the next 90 days," lacking the will "to make bold, courageous, anticipatory decisions." Their short-term thinking, unfortunately, sets the stage for a rapid "sharp curve of decline."
Free Market Fundamentalism:
Friedman, Pinochet and the "Chilean Miracle"
A personal essay in hypertext by Scott Bidstrup
www.bidstrup.com/economics.htm

"Fascism should more appropriately be called Corporatism because it is a merger of state and corporate power."
--Benito Mussolini (1883-1945), Fascist Dictator of Italy

Introduction
Much has been written in the popular press and elsewhere about what has become known as "The Chilean Miracle." It is widely assumed by those who read about this "miracle" that what they're reading is based on fact.

The reality is that much of what they are reading, is, in fact, true. Unfortunately, however, it is also largely a half-truth, that does not reflect the actual experience of ordinary Chileans on the ground.

I uncovered this reality a number of years ago when investigating what has happened in Chile since the coup against Salvadore Allende and the rise of Augusto Pinochet. I was interested simply because I had heard so much radically conflicting testimony, truly passionate testimony, on both sides. Such passion, amidst such contradiction, stirred my curiosity. I felt like I had to know what really happened in order to form a valid opinion, and to know what it really meant.

What I discovered is that the reality of Chile today is two-fold. The experience of what happened in Chile is strongly influenced by who you are: the realites of the poor and working class are vastly different than those of the upper classes and the upper middle class. Who benefitted and why from the Pinochet years has strongly influenced what has been written about that epochal time in Chilean, and Latin American, history.

Why this is relevant today is that the Pinochet regime in Chile was a testing ground for much of the economic doctrine that is put in place today around the world, often by force, at the behest of the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, and soon, the Free-Trade Agreement of the Americas. These organizations have, for years, been implementing policies around the world that were first tried in Chile. And the results of these policies have long been apparent. Of greater importance to Americans, is that these policies are now being implemented in the United States. We will soon experience what Chile has now experienced for a generation. It is important for us to know what the results have been, because we are embarking on the same road ourselves.

The organizations listed above are portrayed as trying to solve the problems of poverty and disposession that are the fate of most of the populations of Latin American countries. The policies they are implementing are portrayed as being proven, reliable, fundamental principles of economics that will bring about the benefits of prosperity to everyone. As we shall see, however, the results of these policies can often be quite different from the picture that is often painted. Which begs the question of why the deception. I'll answer that question here as well.

The Background
Throughout the 1950's and 1960's, Chile was touted as the "exception to the Latin American rule." Governed by a succession of democratic and largely transparent governments, Chile had its poverty, but it was nowhere near as severe or as grindingly oppressive as it was in most of the rest of Latin America. Many Americans retired to Chile, attracted by a cheap currency, low real estate prices, a friendly population, a centerist government and a general lack of the social unrest caused by the extreme disparity of wealth and poverty that existed throughout much of the rest of the continent.

But all was not well. As relatively well-off as the Chilean poor were by Latin American standards, they were still very aware of their relative disadvantage. The American ideal of egalitarianism had taken root in Chile, and the poor felt that they were entitled to a more fair deal within the political process, and a more equitable access to the economic life of the country. A succession of center-right governments had ignored the problems and they had begun to fester. By the 1970's, the intellectual ferment in the United States had reached Chile, and the students and intellectuals began to agitate for change.

Seeing the political opportunity this created, into the gap stepped a charismatic, populist leader of the Left, Salvadore Allende, a life-long socialist and supporter of the Communist Party of Chile. Allende had long been an open admirer of Fidel Castro's Cuban revolution and the reforms it had undertaken, particularly those which benefited the poor and dispossessed. He had often run for president, but due to his outspoken support of a Left-wing agenda, not to mention determined behind-the-scenes work by the American government, he had never garnered much support.

By 1970, that had changed. His message of egalitarianism, combined with his view of needed economic reforms, began to create resonance with the intellectuals and students. The fervent opposition by covert operatives of the America Central Intelligence Agency were no longer enough. The mess America was making in Vietnam, the intellectual ferment on American campuses, and the agitation for change by Chile's own poor meant that the egalitarian populism of Allende could no longer be suppressed. In 1970, he put together a coalition of left-wing parties under the banner of the Popular Unity Coalition, and came in first in a field of four candidates of the election of that year. By October, the parliament had certified the election, and Allende became the first freely elected Marxist president in world history, in spite of hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars spent and a huge black propaganda campaign mounted to prevent it, and even launch a coup to prevent its installation. (Blum)

The Problem With Allende
Allende was a minority president. His election had garnered only 36.3% of the electorate for his coalition, and his coalition consisted of four parties, some more left-leaning than he was. His coalition partners pushed for a leftist program, and to a large degree, Allende was swept along. He moved Chile closer to many communist nations, including North Korea, North Vietnam, and China, but especially Cuba, with which he established diplomatic relations for the first time since Castro's revolution in 1959.

As serious as these matters were in the eyes of Washington, the politics didn't compare to the main thrust of his program. He began to attack the structural problems in Chile's economy that had kept the poor in their place. He began to institute measures to end the power of monopoly capitalism, particularly foreign-owned monopolies. In many cases, he nationalized these businesses, and began to operate them at a lower rate of profit, by raising the wages of the poor and working class that were working in them. Among them was the state telephone monopoly, which had been owned by International Telephone and Telegraph. His most egregious act, however, was to nationalize the huge copper mines owned by Anaconda and Kennecott Copper. He had calculated the "excess profits" based on how much more profitable these mines were than similar mines operated elsewhere, and the profit difference was applied against the book value of the mines and their capital assets. The result: Chile owed nothing for the mines. Worse, Allende, a physician by training, understood the cost that malnutrition imposed upon the poor and set out to alleviate the grinding poverty in which so many Chileans were trapped. He ensured that every Chilean schoolchild had access to at least a half-liter of milk each day, and that their parents had access to jobs and the means to feed and educate their children. Median incomes began to rise dramatically in the first two years of Allende's term. To pay for these social programs designed to create opportunities for the poor, rich Chileans who had lived all their lives off of rents, dividends and interest and who had never paid a dime in taxes, found themselves paying taxes for the first time and being forced to morally justify their lives of luxurious liesure at the expense of the poor. They didn't like it one bit. And they began to complain to their friends in Washington.

This did not go down well with Richard Nixon, then U.S. president, and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger, as revealed in a recently declassified letter, feared not that Allende's programs of social democracy and governance to the benefit of the general population were failing, but rather that they were succeeding, and all too well (Parenti). Of course, he was hardly afraid that Chilean Marxist troops would come ashore at Gallipole, but rather, he was greatly fearful that the examples of the successful reforms and the concept of social democracy would "infect" Europe (his words), especially southern Italy, where it would upset the established order of rule by large landowners and economic control by huge corporations - i.e., the ruling elite. In other words, Nixon, Kissinger and the ruling elite knew best, and they weren't about to allow the Chilean people or anyone else to make their own decisions and take self-determination into their own hands. Nixon's decision was to impose an embargo on Chile (he said in a staff meeting that he intended to "make the Chilean economy scream" and blame it on Allende) and he began a covert plan to overturn the Allende government. In the words of the U.S. ambassador to Chile, "Not a nut or a bolt will reach Chile.... We will do all in our power to condemn Chileans to utmost poverty" (Foran)

The sanctions imposed by the United states began to bite almost immediately. As imports were curtailed by the sanctions regime, prices for what was available began to rise. Conflict between the rich and the poor began to emerge, as the oligarchy began a series of lockouts against the workers, intending to punish them for their support of Allende's reforms. These actions only stiffened the resolve of the poor to resist the acts of economic repression by the oligarchy, and the result was an increase in support for the coalition. In the elections in March of 1973, congressional seats held by the coalition went from 36% to 44% - marking the largest increase by an incumbent coalition ever in a Chilean by-election - and signalling to the oligarchy that the poor were not to be dismissed lightly. The efforts of the right-wing to destabilize the economy and teach the poor a lesson, were only creating more and more disruption and unrest, as CIA activity and propaganda stepped up and the pressure of the embargo increased.

The CIA's Solution
The CIA began one of its most infamous destabilization campaigns (which was later detailed in open testimony in the Church Committee hearings in the U.S. Senate in 1976), in an effort to discredit the Allende regime and create the atmosphere in which a right-wing coup could succeed. In doing so, the CIA was cooperating with a group of large landowners, fascists, anti-communists, industrialists and owners of the mass media. The inevitable turmoil grew, especially as the oligarchy, in a spectacularly well-organized and successful propaganda campaign created and financed by the CIA, pinned the blame for the turmoil on Allende. Death squads began to use blackmail and intimidation in addition to the traditional activities of kidnapping and murder, intending to wear down the patience of the public. The CIA's involvement, including outright subsidies to friendly newspapers such as El Mercurio and pliable or corrupt labor leaders, caused endless strikes, disruption and inconvenience to the Chilean public, and of course, that disruption was grist for the propaganda mills. The CIA worked hard at creating these disruptions, developing "arrest lists, key civilian installations, key government personnel..." who needed to be dealt with. It went so far as to pay civil servants to make "mistakes" in their jobs.Blum, p. 209-213 Finally, when social unrest reached a level where it appeared that a coup could finally succeed, it was organized and executed on September 11, 1973. Holed up in the presidential palace, La Moneda, as air force jets screamed by outside bombing the place, President Allende addressed the nation live. They proved to be his last words: "Probably Radio Magallanes will be silenced and the calm metal of my voice will not reach you. It does not matter... I have faith in Chile and in her destiny. Others will surmount this gray, bitter moment in which treason seeks to impose itself. You must go on, knowing that sooner rather than later the grand avenues will open along which a free people will pass to build a better society" (Burns)

The leader of the coup was a relatively obscure general, Augusto Pinochet, an open admirer of Nazi fascism, and whose favorite music was the propaganda hymns of Nazi Germany. In his first few months in power, with the help and assistance of the CIA, not to mention a lot of covert American-trained death squads and paramilitaries, more than 30,000 dissidents and leftists were rounded up and tortured, at least 3,000 of them disappearing without a trace. So many were detained that the jails couldn't hold them all, and many were kept in the stadium in Santiago, where they lived and slept in the seats and were tortured in the rooms under the grandstands.

Pinochet's reign of terror extended not just to Chile, but to Chilean exiles throughout Latin America and to even back to his mentor nation, the United States. On September 21, 1976, his "Operation Condor" asassinated, on the streets of Washington, D.C., Orlando Letalier, who had been the Chilean Minister of Defense under Allende. Also killed in the bombing was Ronnie Moffit, an American colleague of Letelier. Clearly, Pinochet was a man whose boundaries were not set by ethical or moral principles. It was this event, and U.S. involvement in it, among other things that led to the Church Committee hearings.

Augusto Pinochet and Milton Friedman
Of course, bringing a reign of terror to Chile wasn not why the CIA had sponsored him. The reason he was there was to reverse the gains of the Allende social democracy and return control of the country's economic and political assets to the oligarchy. Pinochet was convinced, through supporters among the academics in the elite Chilean universities, to try a new series of economic policies, called "neoliberal" by their founders, the economists of the University of Chicago, led by an economist by the name of Milton Friedman, who three years later would go on to win a Nobel Prize in Economics for what he was about to unleash upon Chile.

Friedman and his colleagues were referred to by the Chileans as "the Chicago Boys." The term originally meant the economists from the University of Chicago, but as time went on, as their policies began to disliquidate the middle class and poor, it took on a perjorative meaning. That was because as the reforms were implemented, and began to take hold, the results were not what Friedman and company had been predicting. But what were the reforms?

The reforms were what has come to be called "neoliberalism." To understand what "neoliberal" economics is, one must first understand what "liberal" economics are, and so we'll digress briefly from our look at Chile for a quick introduction to the term:

"Neoliberalism" - What Is It? What Does It Mean?
"Are we in like Manner to be given up to the Disposal of the East India Company, who have now the Assurance, to step forth in Aid of the Minister, to execute his Plan, of enslaving America? Their Conduct in Asia for some Years past, has given simple Proof, how little they regard the Laws of Nations, the Rights, Liberties or Lives of Men. They have levied War, excited Rebellions, dethroned lawful Princes, and sacrificed Millions for the Sake of Gain. The Revenue of Mighty Kingdoms have centered in their Coffers. And these not being sufficient to glut their Avarice, they have, by the most unparalleled Barbarities, Extortions, and Monopolies, stripped the miserable Inhabitants of their Property, and reduce whole Provinces to Indigence and Ruin. Fifteen hundred Thousands, it is said, perished by Famine in one Year, not because the Earth denied its Fruits; but [because] this Company and their Servants engulfed all the Necessaries of Life, and set them so high at a Rate that the poor could not purchase them."
--"Rusticus," an anonymous author writing in "The Alarm," a colonial American newspaper, 1773.
The term stems from the original "liberal" economics of Adam Smith, who published his "Wealth of Nations" in 1776, the same year that the American revolution began in earnest. In that seminal classic, the first to really adequately describe the functioning of market economics, Smith argued that markets work best when there is minimal interference from government, and that neither government, nor market players with any significant share of power, should be allowed to interfere with the "unseen hand" of the free market. What "neoliberals" do not understand, and very few are aware of, is the fact that Adam Smith mentioned limited liability corporations only twelve times in "Wealth of Nations," and each time, he made it clear that his views did not favor them. In fact, he viewed transnational corporations (such as the East India Company, one of the largest transnationals of his day) with considerable mistrust and even alarm. He'd seen their behavior in India and the American colonies, and wanted no part of those abuses which had played no small part in bringing about the American revolution itself, through the tax concessions it had won from the British crown at the ruinous expense of American colonial competitors. Smith felt, as did most of his contemporaries, that markets function only when populated by large numbers of small, preferably local players, who are kept free of the restraining influence of powerful corporations, monopolies and excessive governmental intrusion.

The Founding Fathers of the American revolution had seen the abuses of the East India Company, and shared that mistrust. Laws were enacted throughout the colonies that limited what corporations could do, what size they could achieve, and how they could behave in the market, and most importantly, for how long they would remain enfranchised. Yet the money made by corporations supplying the war effort in the Civil War gave them the money and power they needed to get those laws changed. The first to succeed in doing so was the Union Pacific Railroad, in 1867. Chartered for the purpose of building half of a transcontinental railroad, it was also the first to use bribery, influence peddling, stock "watering," laying shoddy track only to qualify for the subsidies for which it qualified, and a host of other corporate abuses, still seen today. But its power had grown to the point where the abuses were largely unstoppable, largely as the result of misinterpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Santa Clara County vs. Southern Pacific, in which it was incorrectly assumed that the Supreme Court granted corporations the rights of "natural" persons. Other entrepreneurs, seeing the UPRR's success, and Southern Pacific's new legal rights, emulated them both with a series of other large limited liability corporations, and by the end of the 19th Century, those entrepreneurs had become known as the Robber Barons. Wealth became so concentrated in such few hands that it hobbled the economic growth of the nation in what became known as the Robber Baron Era, or The Guilded Age.

By the Great Depression of the 1930's, it had become apparent that unrestrained free markets had some serious flaws. First, the unrestrained accumulation of wealth brought with it the unrestrained accumulation of power - railroads were, for example, literally buying and selling corrupt state legislatures and U.S. senators among themselves as if they were commodities. The abuses of the Robber Baron Era had brought with it a replay of the abuses of the East India Company a century earlier and created in the popular mind an understanding of the need to rein in the power that the unrestrained concentration of wealth could bring. Second, it had become obvious that there were certain functions that simply worked better when government ran them; road networks were the first, as it was obviously impractical to have to pay tolls to every property owner along a thousand miles of road. Second was the postal system. Chaos would rein if one had to buy a stamp for every private mail operator a letter might have to be handled by, so a single, unified postal system made a lot of sense. Water supplies and sewage and garbage collection were other examples. In a later era, electric power and telephone utilities would also arise as problematical, when streets were being rendered constantly impassible by continuous construction being done by one utility company after another. Some streets were left dark at noon by the forest of telephone wires from different, competing companies on overhead cables and wires.

Additionally, it became apparent that if private banks were allowed to freely control the money supply without any restraint, that a continuous cycle of boom and bust, caused by monetary inflation and contraction were inevitable. These business cycles had wreaked havoc and had caused much misery throughout the 19th century, and into the 20th, leading to the overwhelming misery of the Great Depression. What to do about it?

Into that gap of understanding stepped John Maynard Keynes. Keynes explained that government had a legitimate role in economic management, and in the regulation of "natural monopolies," whether by direct ownership or by tight regulation of private ownership. By engaging in deficit spending during contractions, and running budget surpluses during inflation, business cycles could be reined in and the misery of business panics could be avoided. Further, he argued among other things that business cycles had the effect of transferring vast sums of wealth from the poor to the rich, as a result of the fact that the poor had few means of defending themselves from the effects of a business panic or a monetary inflation, and the rich not only could defend themselves, but could even exploit the business cycle. This is why unregulated markets always created societies with a tiny, rich elite and a vast, disposessed lower class.

Keynes' ideas became known as "Keynesian economics." They became the cornerstone of Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies in dealing with the effects of the Great Depression. Roosevelt could see that the Crash of '29 had transferred truly vast amounts of wealth from the poor to the rich, leaving a whole nation impoverished, and so he sought to tax that wealth and allow access to it by means of government make-work policies. The idea was to not only create a middle class, but transfer most of the poor into it my providing them the opportunities to uplift their circumstances. In doing so, he earned the undying emnity of the wealthy, whose money he was taxing to pay for it. They sought their revenge. They got it by the "invention" of "neoliberalism."

"Neoliberalism" is not based on Adam Smith, as is often claimed for it by the libertarian propaganda, but is, in reality, based largely on the ideas of an Austrian economist, Friedrick Hayek, who had written in the 1930's that the control of an economy by a government is the "road to serfdom," as he titled his treatise. Asserting that human rights sprang from property rights, he claimed that a society could be no more free than its economy. The two principal failures of his analysis, were of course, first, the premise that human rights are a function of property rights, and that a society that planned its economy was doomed to serfdom. What Hayek never considered is that the obverse of such a policy is obviously that someone who has no property, has no rights, which means that person is, quite obviously, vulnerable to the very serfdom that Hayek claimed to fear. Witness the millions in debt-slavery in India and much of the rest of the world - the very serfdom that Hayek claimed to be repulsed by. The second major error was the assumption that corporations were entitled to the same property rights as individuals, and yet somehow deserved an exemption from liability that individuals do not enjoy - a basic inequality of rights. But nevertheless, his ideas had a great deal of resonance among social libertarians, who were highly enamored of an economic theory that corresponded to their social theories. It also found additional resonance in the writings of the Russian philosopher and popular novelist, Ayn Rand, and became the basis of her philosophical celebration of what can only charitably be described as selfishness.

The conservatives of the Republican Party in the U.S. in the 1960's and 1970's used that period of slow economic growth as a means of persuading policymakers that Keynesian economics had somehow failed, and that only a turn to the deregulation advocated by Hayek could solve the problems of "stagflation" that had become such an intractible problem. So, claiming that Keynes was dead, "neoliberal economics" was born, brought to life in America by a bald, mousy-looking economist from the University of Chicago, by the name of Milton Friedman. Friedmand knew that Hayek's ideas were functionally anti-egalitarian, regardless of the title of his most famous book, yet Friedman privately, but freely admitted that he was not an egalitarian and didn't care about fairness. This made him the instant darling of the "neo-liberals."

Friedman was the undying, sworn enemy of Keynesian economics. He widely publicized what he considered to be a need to return to the "unseen hand" of the market to cure the "stagflation" of the time. His ideas were exactly what the right-wing rich elites needed in an economic theory. It was simple, easy to understand, superfically reasonable and logical, and above all else, suited their need for an economic theory, which, if implemented, would enable them to accumulate wealth and thereby transfer its accompanying power to themselves without restraint. It suited their desire for revenge and their greed and avarice beautifully. Friedman very quickly became their darling, lavishly gifted, and being driven around the University of Chicago campus in a chauffered limosine. Paul Samuelson, Friedman's long-time rival and the principal advocate of careful, sensible regulation of business and government intervention in the market in the Keynesian mold, tirelessly warned of the anti-eglaitarian dangers of Friedman's approach, but amidst the propaganda, he was largely forgotten, even though it was his ideas that had not only prevented a return to business cycles, but had created a vast middle class in America in just a couple of decades following world war II. And ultimately, it was Samuelson's ideas which in the end saved the Chilean economy.

The "Neoliberal" Chilean Miracle
The "neoliberals" needed a testbed to "prove" their ideology and refine their repressive methods. And since Chile had just been handed to a kindred spirit, Augusto Pinochet, he was recuited to try them out and see how well they worked. The idea wasn't really to actually test them, as much as it was to create the illusion that they worked, whether they actually did or not, so they could be sold everywhere else in the world under a variety of labels: "neoliberalism," "free-market economics," "libertarian economics" and "the Washington Consensus." Most objective economists knew quite well from the beginning that they wouldn't work in the long run and many said so publicly, but were quickly shouted down in the intellectual coup-de-etat of the Ronald Reagan years.

There were five cardinal points of "neoliberal" agenda that were and are to be implemented wherever it was or is to be implemented, beginning in Chile. They include:

* The supremacy of the free market. The market was to rule supreme, unrestrained by the intervention of government, labor unions, or anything else (other than corporate monopoly power) that constrained the operation of market forces, regardless of how much social disorder, suffering or exploitation results. Any undesirable effects are to be ascribed simply to "unidentified interventions" which, when they were identified, could be eliminated, and the problem solved thereby. Monopolies were simply assumed, against all evidence, to be self-limiting (though no one ever managed to explain how DeBeers Consolidated Mines had managed to create and maintain a worldwide monopoly on the diamond business for more than a century).
* Cutting, and eliminating when possible, expenditure for social services. Again, in the name of reducing government interference in the market, it was not necessary for government to involve itself in social welfare programs. To explain the obvious sufferinng that results, it is therefore claimed that when the poor suffer, it is due to their own laziness that they do not better themselves. That the accumulation of money was equivalent to the accumulation of power, with its attendant distortion of the functionings of the market, was not a concern. That this led inevitably to the disempowerment of the poor was not a concern - the poor were blamed for their condition by claiming their "inferiority" or "bad decisions." Social justice was a non-issue.
* Deregulation. If government is interfering in the market, it will only lead to a loss of profits, and therefore, government regulation had to be assumed to be bad. Therefore, it has to be reduced or eliminated, even in monopolistic situations. One neoliberal, Grover Norquist, an official in the George W. Bush administration commented that he wanted to reduce the size of government to the point where he "could drown it in the bathtub" - and then go on to do so.
* Privatization. Since government is assumed, as a given, to be inefficient, lazy, bloated and uneconomical in the provisioning of goods and services, it was only reasonable to presume that private enterprise could and would perform the delivery of services in a more efficient manner, and hence any activity that delivers goods or services to citizens should and must be privatized. Never was an explanation offered for the contrary incentive of capitalism - that the capitalist's basic profit-driven incentive is to charge as much money as possible for providing as few goods and services as possible.
* Elimination of the concept of "Community" or the "Common Good." Since this is antithetical to the notion of privatization and "rugged individualism," the concept of the commons (the air we must all breathe, the water we must all drink, etc.) to them, reeks faintly of Communism, it is assumed to be bad, wrong, and hence is oppositional to the "neoliberal" agenda. Such notions as public health, public education, etc., are to be replaced by private initiative, as anything else is simply considered to be a manifestation of lassitude, indolence and governmental dependence.

Pinochet allowed Milton Friedman and his cronies, principally Arnold Harberger, along with a small clique of Chilean "neoliberal" economists to implement this "neoliberal" agenda. Here was Friedman's chance to prove himself right and Samuelson wrong. Friedman was given a more-or-less free hand to implement whatever economic reforms he deemed needed, and Friedman did so with a vengeance. In a quick succession of reforms, the collective-bargaining law was abolished, essentially eliminating the influence of labor unions. The minimum wage law was abolished. The Social Security System was privatized, by being evenly divided among six companies, each to compete with each other. Public assets were sold, often at bargain basement prices, to whoever would buy them.

On the political side, Pinochet did his part by rounding up any opponents of the "neoliberal" agenda. Anyone who questioned the wisdom of the reforms being implemented by the "Chicago Boys" was swiftly rounded up and, as often as not, never heard from again. Trade union organizers, economic justice advocates, Leftists and anyone else who objected to the reforms began to disappear. By the end of his regime, Pinochet was responsible for the deaths of at least 3,000 people and the disappearance of many thousands more.

Gradually eliminating their political competition within the military and civilian bureacracy, the Chicago Boys had, by 1975, accumulated enough political capital to implement their program pretty much as they pleased. They began a series of far-reaching reforms - which they called "shock treatment" - which included devaluing and floating the currency, steeply increasing interest rates and slashing tariffs to counteract the inflation that the devaluation would have caused, while greatly reducing public expenditures. They abolished all taxes on wealth and business profits, and began slashing government workforces, including selling off any and all state-owned enterprises.

Social reforms included school choice, labor law reform, social welfare reform, and many other similar proposals that would be instantly familiar to current American conservatives as part of their own agenda. The effects, however, were exactly what American social liberals had predicted - a generalized increase in poverty, disease, homelessness, and a general spread of squalor, unrest and disaffection - all effects that were of no concern whatever to the Chicago Boys.

The land reforms carried out by the two previous administrations, including Allende's, were also reversed. But the reversals were not to restore the land to its previous owners, but rather to consolidate ownership of it for the use of export-oriented corporations. The slogan was "the three 'F's,' fruit, forest products and fish." Never mind that those whose land had been expropriated were not compensated or offered other means of employment. They were left to fend for themselves, swelling the ranks of the already previously disposessed, former members of the working class who had worked, often for years, in the newly-abandoned factories, and were left with nothing.

The Chicago Boys began privatizing anything and everything in sight - 212 state-owned enterprises in all, including utilities - resulting in steep rises in utility costs, transportation costs and health care costs for ordinary Chileans. The banks were an especially interesting case. The Chicago Boys convinced Pinochet that freeing the banks from government regulation would attract foreign investment, and competition would enforce fiscal discipline and honest accounting. So in a case of deregulation gone berserk, the general sold off all six state-owned banks to the first comers. They quickly fell into the hands of two speculators, Javier Vial and Manuel Cruzsat. These two then promptly used the banks as collateral on loans obtained from foreign sources to buy up local industrial enterprises. Disliquifying these enterprises generated more cash, which Vial and Cruzsat then used for even more leveraged buyouts, and as the end approached, these go-getters got themselves gone. It was a classic Ponzi scheme. Soon, Chileans faced the problem of having no trustworth banks at all through which they could conduct banking transactions.

Freed from the heavy hand of bureacracy, business regulation, taxes and public-owned enterprise, the economy took off - right off a cliff and into a severe recession. The slowdown had the predictable effect on Chile's industrial sector, resulting in massive layoffs and reduced economic activity. Suddenly, Chile's large and prosperous middle class found itself facing huge unemployment increases, rapidly falling salaries and rapidly increasing living costs.

The economic performance of the Chilean economy after the application of the "shock treatments" was anything but impressive. While there were three short bursts of impressive economic growth (which were impressive mostly because they were really just periods of recovery), they were interspersed with the classic steep, sharp, much lengthier contractions, which simply added to the growing misery of the poor and the former middle class. The later recessions, the last of which synchronized with world-wide recessions, were exacerbated by the liberalization of trade policies, making it more difficult for local industries to compete, either locally or internationally. Add to that the banking collapse caused by the privatization of the banking system, created widespread problems with credit, especially for the poor, and the stage was set for economic failure. Blood and glass began to litter factory floors throughout the country. Real economic output declined by a full 19% in 1982 and 1983 alone. The Chicago Boys, in classic Orwellian doublespeak, declared the results a terrific success, in spite of the remarkably poor metrics. The U.S. State Department seemed to agree, declaring "Chile is a casebook study in sound economic management." Ronald Reagan's propaganda machine was also highly supportive. Almost no one questioned it when Art Laffer, a Reagan protoge and colleague of Milton Friedman, coined the phrase, "The Chilean Miracle," and stated that Chile is "a showcase of what supply-side economics can do" (Palast) It certainly was for those who bothered to look.

Back in the streets of Chile, things hadn't been a miracle, they'd been a disaster. It was the results of the privatization of the banks that proved to be the last straw for the Chilean people. By 1982 the pyramid scheme being run by Vial and Cruzsat had collapsed, leading to the foreclosure of the banks and the complete loss of the meager savings of millions of Chileans, and surplus labor led to their inability to live day to day on their rapidly falling salaries. Riots and demonstrations by people so desperate they no longer feared bullets forced Pinochet to reconsider the Chicago Boys and their failed economic policies which had simply been re-creating the boom-bust cycle that had caused the hated Keynes to formulate his theories of government intervention in the first place five decades earlier. Pinochet demanded and got the resignation of his economics minister, Sergio de Castro. It was a sign that the Chicago Boys had fallen from grace. The dictatorship quickly moved to re-nationalize the banks to keep them afloat and prevent a liquidity crisis and economic downturn from turning into a complete wholesale economic collapse. He moved swiftly to re-impose some of those policies most hated by his supporters - a minimum wage law, a restoration of collective bargaining rights and a jobs-creation program to create 500,000 new jobs. The newly privatized pension schemes were also being run like pyramid schemes, and were on the brink of collapse. To save them, he imposed stringent new regulations concerning their operations. To save the economy, Pinochet embarked on a nationalization scheme that would have left even Allende breathless - he expropriated at will, offering little if any compensation for what he nationalized. Much of what he appropriated would eventually be slowly re-privatized, much more carefully this time, but the very symbol of Chile and the mainstay of its foreign exchange earnings - the copper industry - would remain in state hands. Going even further, Pinochet instituted a law - still in force - that gives the military 10% of the revenues from the copper production. All this caused Pinochet's critics to quip that he'd embarked on "the Chicago Road to Socialism." The Chicago Boys were summarily dumped on a plane to Chicago - and told they weren't going to be welcomed back anytime soon.

But Pinochet's new economic team still included the Chilean "neoliberals," however. They continued to push for the "neoliberal" agenda, mostly as a result of the fact that the generals were in power in Chile because the Reagan administration in Washington wanted them to be, and because Reagan was a "neoliberal" himself and insisted on these policies. So those that caused only mild discomfort, if not the ones causing huge disruptions, remained in place. To this day, Santiagoans ride city buses run by private companies, and put up with delays, bad service, disruptions and dirty equipment, rather than the clean, efficient and well-run buses they had before. But at least they can now confidently put their money in regulated state banks.

A Second Look
By 1988, Pinochet had convinced himself that the country and his institutionalizaton of the reforms he had instituted, were ready for the plebiscite. In an act of hubris so typical of right-wingers and the neoliberal ideologues, he held the plebiscite, confident of victory. The only problem was that he lost. Even with all the spoiled ballots and stuffed ballot boxes, the refusals to vote, the vote rigging that was rampant, Pinochet still could not claim a majority of the votes cast. He had to admit to defeat. It was a bitter pill for the old man to have to swallow. His neoliberalism, as well has his right-wing authoritarianism, had made him the most hated man in all of Chile.

The people of Chile had had enough of Pinochet and his "neoliberalism," yet they were saddled with a constitution that virtually institutionalized both Pinochet and what "neoliberal" reforms remained. So even though he was officially gone, he was still the power behind the scenes, and everyone knew it.

So even as I write this, many of the "neoliberal" reforms he didn't reverse remain largely intact. What has become of Chile? Now, twenty-odd years on, we can see the long term results of "neoliberal" economics: From the beginning of the reforms of the Chicago Boys in 1973 through 1986, there was no economic growth. Real mean salaries, adjusted for inflation, have declined by 10% since 1986 and by 18% from what they were during the Allende years. Median salaries have fared even worse, declining by 30% over the same period, signalling a torrent of wealth from the poor and middle class to the rich. When Allende was in power, less than 20% of the country lived in absolute poverty; by 1990 40% did. That figure has remained largely constant since. A third of the nation now survives on less than $30 per week. Some miracle indeed.

Enthusiastic supporters of the Pinochet reforms like to point out that since 1986, there has been a 7 percent annual growth rate; what they fail to mention is that this occurred only after 1986, after privatization of the banks was reversed, and collective bargaining rights and minimum wage laws were restored; after jobs-creation programs were instituted and privatization of the principal source of foreign exchange was reversed. And they fail to point out that all of that additional wealth has gone into the pockets of the few; the middle class and poor have seen none of it. The much-ballyhooed privatized Social Security system, which is being held up as a model for the United States to follow, is seriously being considered for re-nationalization, since the public system that runs along side it is producing vastly better results (almost twice the benefits of the private systems). When it was privatized, those who opted to remain in the public system are sure glad now that they did.

Yet the remaining "neoliberal" reforms continue to bite. The reforms are the reason why nearly all of that much ballyhooed annual growth has gone straight into corporate profits that benefit the rich, and less than ever into the pockets of the poor and working classes - note the declining median income as mentioned above. Milton Friedman and his Chicago Boys are quite well aware of this, but simply don't care, because social justice is not their concern. All that matters to them is the increase in Gross Domestic Product - evidence of economic growth. The fact that it the increase is going entirely into the pockets of a tiny handful of the rich, suits him just fine. Remember, in his view the wealthy are wealthy because they deserve to be - and the same for the poor. As he often said, fairness was not an issue for him - the theory is apparently more important than the results of the theory - in other words, it was a religion, not a science.

Consider that even in the United States, which is hardly a paragon of equitable wealth distribution, 60% of economic output goes into wages, and 40% into corporate profits. Yet in Chile, those numbers are exactly reversed. Chile now rates as the seventh worst nation in the world for equality of wealth distribution - tied with Kenya and Zimbabwe. Nearly all of the wealth being generated by the 7% growth rate is going straight into the pockets of a tiny number of the elite - and the only construction boom in the country in the last fifteen years has been going on in the very richest suburbs of Santiago.

Some miracle.

The Salvation of Chile
The salvation of Chile, then, to the extent it has had one, clearly wasn't Pinochet, nor was it the Chicago Boys. It was a recognition by Pinochet, however reluctantly, and in however limited a fashion, that the "neoliberal reforms" had led to intolerable levels of misery and social unrest.

It was, in fact, the re-introduction of many of the reforms that had been originally introduced by Salvador Allende.

As Greg Palast, an investigative journalist for the British Broadcasting Company noted, there was a miracle, all right, but "it was bright red." The color of Allende's alleged Marxism.

In essence, the salvation of Chile was at least a limited abandonment of free-market fundamentalism and the "Chilean Miracle." It was a recognition that the free market simply does not solve all economic problems, but actually creates many of them, and ignores completely the social consequences of economic decisionmaking.

What Went Wrong
What went wrong was simply the failure of Milton Friedman and his Chicago Boys to come clean about their real agenda, which is not to eliminate poverty or elevate the working class. What went wrong was that the dogmatism of Milton Friedman in his role as an intellectual poodle of the ultra-rich, rather than being an honest broker of economic policies intended to "lift all the boats" - not just the yachts tied to the pier, while threatening the skiffs sitting on the beach.

What went wrong was America's own preoccupation with free-market fundamentalism, and our failure to look beyond the surface propaganda, and our complicity in forcing a discredited and defective economic model on others reluctant to accept it.

But what went wrong mostly was the complete and utter failure of Friedman and the Chicago Boys, Pinochet and his American backers, to consider that economic activity does not occur in a vacuum. It occurs in a social and moral context, and economic decisions have social consequences that simply must be considered. And failure to do so can have severe social consequences that feed back into the economic decisionmaking, and thereby undermine the theoretical framework of the economic premises on which the decisions were based.

What Really Works
There are examples of nations that have lifted themselves from third-world status into first-world status. Japan, Korea, the nations of Western Europe, all come to mind. Other, more recent examples of nations that have begun to lift themselves up are also relevant.

Even the United States was once a third-world nation, and it too had to lift itself up.

How have these nations managed to reduce poverty and improve the standard of living of their inhabitants? It turns out that there are several factors that are common to all such nations. These factors are well-known to economists, and aren't considered controversial anymore, except to free-market fundamentalists.

It is really rather simple, and there are four key factors, and they all contradict the conventional wisdom of free-market fundamentalism:

First, tariff barriers that protect targeted local industries from ruinous foreign competition and allow governments to incubate local industries through subsidy and import substitution. This is how the American steel industry came into being. In the 1860's, most steel in the world, including most of what was used in the United States was produced by Europe. By 1900, the situation was reversed. This situation was accomplished through the use of tariffs in the United States to generate the cash used to subidize exports. The same thing happened with the American agricultural sector - tariffs kept cheap foreign food out, while the U.S. government fostered the growth of a strong and vibrant agriculture through targeted subsidies, the university extension program, and the creation of a rural transportation infrastructure. Once these programs were complete, tariffs were reduced and subsidies reduced or eliminated. The result is that American agriculture now feeds not only America, but much of the world.

Second, government has to work carefully and judiciously with local business to stimulate research, development and the improvement of efficiencies so that they can compete on world markets, and enforce discipline by removing support from players who do not improve their economic efficiency or the quality of their output. An example is the American agricultural industry. It went virtually nowhere in world markets until the U.S. Congress created the university extension system, with its local offices and agents that helped farmers come to understand what they needed to do to produce economically and efficiently enough, with sufficient quality, to compete in world markets. This is how first Japan, and later Korea and Taiwan have become world leaders in the production of consumer electronic goods, and did so in less time than it took Pinochet and the Chicago Boys to ruin Chile's economy.

Third, economic planners have to come to realize that you can't sell something to somebody who has no money - so social justice issues do matter in a purely economic context, even if, like Milton Friedman, you are unconcerned about the moral issues of social injustices. If all economic productivity is absorbed by a tiny elite through power accumulation created by capital accumulation that is not shared through living wages, there is no purchasing power left in an economy to create markets for the goods produced. Government simply must not allow wealth to become excessively concentrated, however that is accomplished. It can avoid this by using taxation of business profits, inheritance taxes and other such means to prevent the excessive concentration of wealth, and use the monies derived for programs to alleviate poverty and social deprivation, and create educational and economic opportunities for the poor. If that sounds like socialism, that is not an accident - socialism is one means (though not necessarily the best) of attempting to do just that.

Fourth, some exports have to be stimulated by subsidy and some imports restricted by tarrifs. Relying on "comparative advantage" simply doesn't work in the real world. Is the automobile industry located in Detroit because Detroit has a comparative advantage? No. It is there because that's where Henry Ford happened to be living when he decided to get into the automobile business. Is Boeing located in Seattle because Seattle has a comparative advantage in aircraft production? No. It's there because that's where the Boeing family happened to be living at the time Boeing's founder decided to start the company. The notion that a nation should stick to doing only that in which it has a "comparative advantage" is also ludicrous when you stop and think about it. Bolivia has a comparative advantage in only one thing - beef production. Does that mean that all Bolivians should want to be gauchos? Hardly! Bolivians want to do the whole range of things that other people in other nations do, and the tax, tariff and subsidy structure of the Bolivian government should reflect that. Additionally, nations, like families, have to earn their keep. For a nation, it is foreign exchange - you cannot buy with other countries' currency when you don't have that currency to spend. So to control purchases and to stimulate sales to keep current accounts in balance, nations, like families, simply must control imports and encourage exports, whether through tax policy or by adjusting the value of the national currency. There is no other way in the long run. At some point, imports and exports have to come to a monetary balance.

Since this is already well understood in the academic world, why is it so controversial? Why are these points so vigorously disputed?

Why do the IMF, WTO and World Bank Aggressively Promote Such Defective Dogma?
There is a widespread assumption that the people who run the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and the World Bank are well-meaning, sincere people who really want to make a difference in the world, helping end poverty and deprivation. And for most of the bureaucrats who work in those institutions, that's true.

This belief, is understandable; it is, after all, these institutions that were created specifically for the noble purpose of empowering the poor and disadvantaged. If these people weren't sincere, and weren't there to make a difference, they would be quickly replaced, wouldn't they?

It is certainly a comforting assumption to think that they would be. After all, the stated purpose of these organizations is to solve the problems of world poverty, end hunger, disease and want and the wars these problems create. Why should anyone think that these organizations aren't really sincerely making an effort to solve these problems?

Well, for a start, there's Chile. If these organizations had made any effort at all to study these doctrines have had in Chile, they'd quickly realize that these doctrines simply don't work as advertised. And it's not just Chile, either. These doctrines have had a dramatic effect in Mexico, where the institution of these policies have caused real wages to decline from $1.32 per hour on average in the in 1970's to only 45 cents per hour today, after the imposition of NAFTA. And they're still declining. The real output of Mexican industry has declined several percent since the North American Free Trade Agreement was signed. And it is still going down.

Beyond Mexico, the destruction of other economies, particularly Argentina, also stand out as dramatic examples of the failures of "neoliberal" policies. Argentina once had an economic output that was equivalent to most nations in Europe. But no more. More than half of its population now lives in abject poverty, the unemployment rate exceeds 30%, real wages are dropping dramatically and economic activity is shriveling at the rate of 25% per year. Why? Because the very same prescriptions imposed on Chile have been imposed by the IMF and World Bank on Argentina, which followed them willingly and to the letter.

Who killed the Argentine economy? The IMF did. And what is truly shocking is that it knew exactly what it was doing. It was part of a deliberate, calculated plan. That's a shocking allegation that I wouldn't believe myself if there weren't proof of it.

Greg Palast, an investigative reporter for the BBC and the Guardian, a British daily of considerable reputation, has obtained documents that are truly a smoking gun. One is a "technical memorandum of understanding" dated September 5, 2000, signed by Pedro Pou, the president of the Central Bank of Argentina. In it, he agreed to largely the same conditions that killed the Chilean economy:

* A twenty percent reduction in the budget deficit, at a time when the economy was poised on the brink of a recession - not a very bright thing to do, when all economists agree that under recessionary pressure, budget deficits should actually be increased, not reduced, even if that means temporary spending deficits.
* Under a boldface heading, titled "improving the conditions of the poor," Argentina agreed to drop salaries in the emergency employment program by 20%. How reducing salaries benefits the recipients remains unexplained.
* A 12-15% reduction in the salaries of civil servants. With less money to spend, of course they spent less. Not a happy thing to have happen during a period of economic contraction and tight money supplies.
* A currency peg of $1 to each Argentine Peso, in spite of the fact that there was downward pressure on the Peso. Pegging a currency when there's downward pressure on it is a guaranteed formula for a reduction in economic activity - imported goods become cheaper, so locally produced goods competing with them become less competitive - and the people who were producing them get laid off during a time of lowering economic activity. Not a wise plan.

To finance this scheme, Argentina agreed to borrow the $128 billion in foreign exchange to support the peg scheme at an interest rate of 16%. The interest, at 16%, therefore comes to $27 billion per year, a billion more than the $26 billion in the loans for which these concessions were extracted!

How do the Argentine people benefit by taking out this loan? They don't! As you can see, they actually lose money!

Why, then, did the IMF even propose such an absurd scheme? And why on earth would Argentina agree to it?

It all makes sense when you start to look at the principals involved, who they are, and how they benefit.

Who benefits by all this and how did they get Argentina to sign such a ridiculous loan document? One must understand who the IMF is and what its agenda is. The International Monetary Fund was one of the three institutions set up in the Bretton Woods Conference at the end of World War II. It was created at the insistence of the great economist, John Maynard Keynes, who insisted that it was necessary to help smaller nations overcome the limitations imposed by their economic size, and help them avoid the misery of economic declines, such as the Great Depression, which was fresh in the memories of conference participants. Large nations like the United States could avoid such declines by careful monetary and fiscal policy, but this option simply was not open to smaller nations. So the U.S., in concert with other nations, created this fund to help smaller, poorer nations work around the limitations imposed by their size.

Until Milton Friedman's "neoliberal" crowd arrived on the scene, it largely behaved that way. But the advent of "neoliberalism" created an opportunity for the kingpins of international finance to use the IMF as basically an extortion and bill-collecting mechanism. The imposition of Friedman's long-discredited policies, in spite of their horrible social costs, made it possible for the international megabanks to use the IMF to collect outstanding loans. Siezing that opportunity, they used their influence to make sure that their people were installed in positions of influence in the IMF. The result has been that the IMF has been hijacked, and has become essentially a means by which international finance force borrowing at userous interest rates, and then collect their loans, no matter how much misery this causes.

It doesn't end there. Others, seeing an opportunity to use the IMF to create and exploit bankruptcy on a vast scale, have also moved in like greedy vultures, using the bankruptcies created by IMF policies as an opportunity to purchase national assets at bargain-basement prices. A classic case is the privatization of water utilities. Using the rubric of "privatization," this means that the poor often find themselves paying vastly more for water, prices they often cannot afford. So the newly-privatized water utility, no longer willing to subsidize water supply to the poor, cuts off the water, and the poor end up carrying water long distances, often from contaminated sources. The result is lowered economic performance (spending time carrying water and recovering from water-borne illness), more disease and the higher social costs to society that result from that disease and child mortality. Even if one does not consider the inhumanity of depriving people of clean, subsidized water, the raw economic costs end up higher, by far, than the presumed "efficiency" gained by private operation of the water utility. When these utilities are privatized, they are usually sold to large foreign multinationals who expatriate the profits - and those expatriated profits become a foreign exchange liability against the country (raising the cost of imports and discouraging other foreign investment), instead of being reinvested or offsetting taxes at home. The hard, basic fact is that economic decisions don't occur in a social vacuum. But "neoliberalism" fails utterly to consider that to be a problem.

This subversion of the goals of the IMF and its hijacking by the "neoliberals" has meant that this only source of credit to many nations has made those nations vulnerable to blackmail. All nations require credit, not just to finance infrastructure projects, but to finance imports as well. This was one of the goals of the IMF - to facilitate that credit. But when a nation finds itself spending more abroad in finance costs than it takes in in export sales, as many third world nations do, it must seek help in financing the debt that creates. That vulnerabilty means that nations often have to do what the IMF wants - even if it is extortionary. So the people of the third world lose, and the international bankers and multinational capitalists win. Once again.

Further proof, if any were needed, that those who have the gold, make the rules. And they make the rules to suit themselves - and the rest of us be damned.